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Since the summer of 1988, radiation effects, in particular single event 
upset (SEll) phenomena, have been monitored in the three mass 
semiconductor memory systems on~board the University of Surrey's 
UoSAT-2 satellite. which is in a TOO km, near-potar low-Earth orbit. 
Almost 5000 events have now been logged by the spacecraft. and these 
have been assembled into a database for analysis by ground-based 
software. This software has allowed the SEU sensitivity of different device 
types to be analysed, and the relative performance of the Mostek 4116. 
Texas 4416 NMOS DRAMs. the Toshiba TC5516. Harris 6564 and 6516. and 
the Hitachi 6264 and 6116 CMOS SRAMS. has been evaluated. The logs of 
in-orbit SEUs on UoSAT-2 have provided several interesting statistics. 
allowing direct comparison of sialic and dynamic RAMs ranging in 
capacity from 4 kilobits to 64 kilobils per chip. An unexpected result has 
been that none of the 288K bytes of B-bit wide stalic RAM on UoSAT-2 
have shown multiple-bit (per byte) upsets over the monitoring period. 
Also. the orbital analysis of UoSAT-2 SEUs shows an overwhelming 
concentration of events in the South Atlantic Anomaly for all device 
types. Further studies are now underway with the University of Surrey's 
UoSAT-3 satellite. This spacecraft carries over 4M bytes of semiconductor 
memory as part of its store-and-forward communictions payload. together 
with the Cosmic Particle I Tolal Dose Experiments CCPE I TOE), 
providing direct measurments of the space radiation environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The UoSAT -2 spacecraft is the second technology-demonstration I educational 
'lightsaf (60 kg) designed and constructed at the Spacecraft Engineering Research 
Unit at the University of Surrey, UKClJ. It was launched into a TOO km, near-polar. 
Sun-synchronous orbit in March 1984. on-board a DELTA launch-vehicle, as a 
secondary payload to the NASA Landsat 0' mission. Of the many systems on-board 
the spacecraft. three contain substantial (in 1984 terms) quantities of semiconductor 
memory. 
Iprepared for the 4th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Smail Satellites. 
August 1990. Logan, Utah. 
These are the Primary On-Board Computer COBC) systemC2J , based ar01.!r;d a 
COP-1802 8-bit microprocessor: the Data Store-and-Readout CDSR) bulk memory 
system[3J. and the Digi tal Communications Experiment CDCEj4J, based around an 
NSC-800 8-bit microprocessor. The memory systems associated with these are all. to 
some extent. susceptible to single-event upset (SED), and each is protected and 
monitored by a mixture of hardware and software error-detection and correction 
(EDAC) coding schemes. 
In summary. Ihe primary aBC monitors 576 kilobits of NMOS dynamic RAM 
CORAM), organised as 48K-by-12-bit bytes (i.e. 8 data bits and 4 EDAC bits per byte), 
via a hardware-implemented EDAC coding scheme. The DSR comprises 1536 kilobits 
of CMOS static RAM (SRAM), organised as two banks of 96K-by-8-bil bytes, but 
without EOAC. The OCE monitors 152 kilobits of CMOS SRAM in total. shared 
between two sub-systems: the RAMUNIT, organised as 96K-by-8-bil bytes, of which 
94K are monitored by a software-implemented EOAC schemel and the PROGRAM 
RAM, organised as 16K-by-12-bit bytes, of which 12K are monitored by a hardware-
implemented EOAC scheme similar to thai in the aBC. 
This gives a total monitoring capability of 589,824 bils of NMOS DRAM. together 
with I.T03,936 bils of CMOS SRAM. 
Single-EveI'll Upsets (SEUs) 
SEUs are temporary bit-state reversals induced in semiconductor devices 
through the action of ionising radiatiOn. Such events may be caused directly by an 
in-comming particle if it deposits sufficient energy within a critical volume of the 
semiconductor lattice, or may be caused as the result of secondary ionisation due to 
the recoil of particles resulting from induced nuclear reactions. 
It is now recognised that SEUs, caused by the heavy-ion component of 
cosmic-rays, and by the trapped particle populations (particularly protons) in the 
gee-magnetic field, are a major concern in spacecraft microelectronicsC5.6.T.8.9.\0J. 
Such effects are becoming increasingly important as device geometries are reduced 
to the micron and sub-micron scale. Total-dose effeds are also extremely important. 
as the extended operational lifetimes required of modern spacecraft can give rise to 
very large (megarad) accumulated doses, albeit delivered at relatively low 
dose-rates compared 10 other ionising environments, such as the interior of nuclear 
reactors. and on the nuclear battle-field. 
Semiconductor devices on-board Earth-orbiting spacecraft have SEU rates 
which depend upon device technology. geometry and manufacture, solar ac\ivily, 
local shielding provided by the spacecraft structure, and the precise orbital 
characteristics of the vehicle. Modelling the interactions between the space-radiation 
environment. the spacecraft structure, and a particular device, is a complex process. 
with Utile experimental data to work on as the relatively long exposure. low 
dose-rate environment - typical of space - is particularly hard 10 simulate on Earth 
in a cost-effective way. 
Thus, it is difficult to make any realistic predictions as to the behaviour of a 
particular device in space, and much more experimental data is required on the 
actual performance of modern semiconductor devices in real space environments. 
-
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With this in mind. a varied selection of memory device types was chosen for 
the UoSAT-2 spacecraft. so that experience could be gained with a variety of 
different device sizes. technologies and manufacturers. 
SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS AND MONITORING STRATEGY 
Primary On-Board Computer (OBC) 
UoSAT-2 uses a CDP-1802 microprocessor as its prirn.ary on-board computer. and 
this has access to aU the major sub-systems in the spacecraft. To facilitate UoSAT-2 
spacecraft operations and provide a degree of autonomy to on-board task 
scheduling, the OBC execules a mulli~lasking operating system known as the DIARY. 
The DIARY software supports multi~tasking, uplink command decoding. command 
macro expansion. event scheduling Cup to one year in advance). telemetry logging 
and reporting, attitude determination and control and synthesised speech generation. 
In addition to this, under a research contract with the European Space Agency 
CESA-ESTEC)[ll.l2J. DIARY routines for SEU detection. logging and reporting were 
developed at Surrey and implemented on the spacecraft during 1988. 
Table 1 
OBC MEMORY DEVICES 
Manufacturer Part Chip Size Quantity (JCsJ 
Mostek MKB4JJ6j-83 16K x J-bit 12 
Texas TMS441 6-1 5NL 16K x 4-bit 3 
Texas TMS4416-20L 16K x 4-bif 3 
The OBC memory is divided inlo two main areas. a 16K-by-12~bit byte area for 
program storage. and a 32K~by-12~bil byte area to hold data coltecled from on-
board experiments. These memory areas are buill from NMOS dynamic RAMs, the 
16K byte area is built from twelve 16K~by~l-bii DRAMs (4116 type). and the 32K 
byte area uses six 16K~by-4~bit DRAMs (4416 type). Both areas are protected by 
hardware error detection and correction (EDAC) circuitry. 
The EDAC system is a Hamming code generator which calculates four check 
bits for each 8-bit data byte. When a byte is written to RAM, four Hamming check 
bits are generated and stored. resulting in 12-bits being stored for every byte. When 
a byte is read from RAM, a Hamming decoder checks the integrity of the data. If 
the data contains a single bit error, the Hamming bits are used to generate the 
correct data, and the corrected data are passed to the CPU. Each time that the 
decoder detects and corrects an error. an SEU counter is incremented. Errors which 
involve more than one-bit upset per byte are not indicated. However, this is not a 
problem as the key program memory has the 12-bits of each byte spread over [2 
devices, ensuring a large degree of physical and electrical separation. making it 
extremely unlikely that a single particle could cause more than one bit-upset in a 
byte. That said, the internal geometry of Ihe 4~bit wide devices. is such that they 
may well be susceptible to multiple-bit per-byte upsets. However. the evidence 
from UoSAT·2 suggests that such events must be quite rare. 
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Fig. I Hamming Error Detection and Correction for the aBC Memory 
The EDAC system does nol automaticatly correct data slored in RAM. When an 
SEU is detected, the correct data byte is sent to the CPU, but it is nol slored in the 
RAM. Le. the RAM itself still contains the SEU. Correct data and code bits are only 
slored when the CPU writes a byte 10 the RAM. If a byte experiences an SEU. and 
then experiences another before the first has been correded, the byte will contain 
two bit errors, and the Hamming code will not be able to correct it. Therefore. to 
ensure that errors do not accumulate in the memory. a software memory 'wash" is 
implemented, The memory wash reads each memory location in turn and then 
immediately writes the value back into memory. Thus, SEUs are actually corrected 
in the RAM before further SEUs can occur. 
The wash forms part of the DIARY interrupt code. One byte is 'washed' on 
every call to this code. provided that there is no previous SEU still to be logged by 
the 'EDAC Error Logging Task in the DIARY's main loop. The wash software 
monitors the EDAC counter before and after each byte is read, as the counter will 
increment if a SEU is detected. If the counter increments. an 'error- flag' is raised by 
the wash routine, which is serviced by the error log task. This task records the 
address of the error, the total number of errors since program initialisation. and the 
current lime and date, as defined by the OBC's hardware clock. These data are 
slored in a circular buffer which can accommodate 32 such events. 
-
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-The time taken to wash the entire memory is approximately 8.25 mirlutes. This 
is sufficiently fast to give a very low probability of two or more particles affecting 
a particular byte before any previous error has been corrected. 
Whenever UoSAT-2 is within range of the command groundslalion at the 
University of Surrey, downlink data are automatically collected and stored on the 
hard disc of an IBM-compatible microcomputer. The raw data include telemetry. 
long-term data surveys. and the aBC EDAC error log data. The raw error log data 
are processed by ground-station software, and are eventually combined with data 
from an orbital model to form records in the aSIRIS 2 database. These data are 
then amenable to further statistical. temporal and geographical analysis. Data on the 
SEU behaviour of the aBC memories have been collec:ed continuously since 
September 1988. 
Data SIare-and-Readout mSR) Experiment 
The Data Store-and-Readout CDSR) Experiment consists of two 96K-by-8-bil byte 
banks of CMOS SRAM which can be serially loaded and read under hardware logic 
control. Each DSR bank contains 48 2K-by-8-bit CMOS SRAMs ITC5516 type). One of 
these banks has been dedicated to SEU monitoring, whilst the second bank has been 
left free for other on-board experiments, with occasional monitoring for SEUs. 
Table 2 
DSR MEMORY DEVICES 
Manufacturer Chip Size Quantity (fCs) 
Toshiba TC5516AP-2 2K x 8-bit 96 
The data sources for the DSR experiment are the OBC. the CCD Earth-Imaging 
Camera Experiment and the Particle-Wave/Electron Spectrometer Experiment. Data 
from the DSR may be output to either the OBC or directly to the spacecraft's 
downlink. Downlink transmissions from the DSR memory (usually at 4.8 kbpsl can 
be' initiated by ground-command or by OBC DIARY scheduling. 
Unlike OBC downlink dala. DSR data are sent in addressed, error-protected 
packets. The 96K bytes of dala are divided into 168 packets, each containing 128 
byles of data, The packets are prefixed with an address indicating where in memory 
the packet came from, and a 'cyclic redundancy check' (CRC) is transmitted at the 
end of each packet. The CRe is checked by the receiving software in the 
groundstation. and any packets which contain reception errors are rejected. Because 
the DSR is not a computer-controlled system. no acknowledgements are sent by the 
groundstation to the DSR during data transfer, the DSR simply sends 168 data packets 
and then starts again with the first packet. The groundstation software receives 
packets, files those which are error-free. and waits until an entire DSR image has 
been built up, If the entire image is not received. there wilt be 128-byte gaps in 
the data. These gaps must be detected so that they do not interfere with SEU 
monitoring. 
20rbiting Satellite Ionising Radiation Interactions with Semiconductors 
As the DSR contains no microprocessor or EDAC system. it cannot be 
programmed to monitor SEUs, and the serial links with the OBC are too slow to 
make OBC monitoring of SEUs in the DSR practicaL Therefore. the complete DSrt 
memory image is down linked each week and checked for SEUs in the command 
groundstalion. 
In order to facilitate this a program was written for the OBC to generate a 
fixed pattern of data, and write it across the serial network of the spacecraft for 
storage in the DSR (Bank 'X). This pattern constitutes the initial 'reference image', 
against which any bit changes can be detected. It was loaded into the DSR Bank 'A' 
memory on the 21st July 1988. and SEU activity has been monitored ever since. 
Groundstalion software compares each week's downloaded memory image with 
the reference image, and any differences between the two indicate SEUs. The 
possibility that there may be gaps in a received DSR image complicates the SEU 
detection procedure. However, this is dealt with by keeping a reference file. 
containing the most recently-received copy of each packe!. Each packet in.a 
newly-received image is compared to its corresponding reference, and any 
differences are logged as SEUs. SEUs must have occurred between the reference date 
and the current date, and in most cases, this will be one week. In practice, because 
very few packets - if any - are missed during the weekly download. the maximum 
time-span between consecutive checks of a memory location is two weeks. 
Digital Communications Experiment (DCE) 
The VoSAT -2 Digital Communications Experiment CDeE) is a proof-of-concept 
store-and-forward digital message transponder. which provided one of the first 
civilian demonstrations of low-Earth orbit store-and-forward communications between 
inexpensive satellite terminals attached to standard personal computers [13.14.15J. 
Table 3 
DCE MEMORY DEVICES 
Manufacturer &!1 Chip Size Quantify (fCs) 
Harris H6564 4J( x i-bit 3 hybrids equivalent to 
48 HM-6504s 
Harris MI65!6-9 2K x 8-bit T 
Hitachi HM6264LP-! 2 8K x 8-bit 8 
Hitachi HM61!6L-3 2K x 8-bit 8 
Hitachi HM6JJ6-3 2K x 8-bi! 8 
The NSC-800 microprocessor uses both hardware and software EDAC to monitor 
SEUs. SEU logs are communicated to the command station using the slore-and-
forward automatic-repeal-request CARQ) communications protocol. and subsequent 
data analysis is performed by groundstalion computers [l6J. 
SEU Monitoring in Hardware-EDAC Protected ·PROGRAM RAM'. Programs and 
critical data are stored in the Harris 6564 hybrid memories. Each 8-bit data byte in 
this memory is protected by a 4-bil Hamming error detection and correction CEDAC) 
code in the manner described for the OBC. A memory wash routine similar to that 
used in the OBC runs on the DCE and protects the hardware-EDAC memory against 
-
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accumulating SEUs. As the underlying memory devices are I-bit wide. the chance 
of getting a multiple-bil per-byte error due to a single particle is extremely remote. 
As with the aBC. the SEUs are logged in terms of address and time of 
occurence. The DeE does not contain a real-time dock. and so time stamps for the 
DeE SEU log are read by the NSC-800 CPU from the VoSAT -2 serial telemetry 
stream. This telemetry clock is derived from separate hardware 10 that for the aBC 
clock used for time-stamping errors in the aBC memory. and so the time-tags have 
to be treated separately when calibrating the logged-limes to true GMT_ 
A permanent 'hard'-faiture occurred in this area of memory between orbits 
12844 and 12851 in 1986 (In, and since then only 12K bytes (Le. 144 kilobits) of the 
16K bytes (J92 kilobits) have been monitored and in active use. Since it takes 
approximately 5.25 minutes for the DCE to completely wash the remaining 12K 
bytes of EOAC-protected memory. the OCE may log an SEU up to 5.25 minutes 
after its actual occurrence. 
SEUs are logged in an on-board circular buffer which is capable of recording 
32 events. and since the event rate is normally very low (approximately one event 
per ten days). there is little danger of this buffer being overrun between downloads. 
The log is kept in an area of hardware-EDAC memory, and the command sial ion 
downloads it using the DeE message system store-and-forward communications 
protocol. as part of the normal message traffic. 
SEU Monitoring in the Software Protected ·RAMUNIT'. As well as the 16K bytes of 
hardware EOAC-protected program memory. the DCE has 96K bytes (Le. 768 
kilobitsJ of memory used for storing messages. This memory is referred to as the 
'RAMUNIT, and is comprised of B-bit-wide CMOS SRAMs. Eight of the devices 
(6264sJ store 8K bytes each and sixteen devices (6116s) store 2K bytes each. 
The RAMUNIT has no hardware EDAC, therefore a software EDAC system has 
been developed and installed. 
The NSC-800 uses the RAMUNIT as a RAM disk, writing-to and reading-from 
the RAMUNIT in 256-byte blocks - analogous to the sectors of a computer's disk 
drive. Therefore, a block code was the logical choice of EDAC code in this 
environment. Other criteria used in the selection of a code were:-
J) computationally efficient encoding and decoding, 
2) low coding overhead. 
3) ability to detect burst errors (because of the possibility that a single 
charged particle might cause a number of simultaneous bit-upsets in a 
single byte or block of memoryJ. 
To meet these various requirements, Dr. M.S. Hodgart and Jeff Ward of the 
University of Surrey. devised an efficient implementation of a multiple-polynomial 
generalised Burian code which can identify and locale a single- or multiple bit 
upset confined to a single byte anywhere in a 253-byle data block. The code detects 
but will not corred a burst error of nol more than 9 bits spread over two bytes. and 
the code is guaranteed to deted (but not correct) any error which upsets two bytes 
in a block. 
Any event worse than this is virtually guaranteed to be detected. but may be 
incorrectly identified as a less severe error. By far the most common events are 
single bit events. all of which are deteeled and correded by this code. 
In order to implement this code. each 256-byte RAMUNIT memory block IS 
broken into two 128-byle sub-blocks. and each of these is encoded using the 
Hodgart-Burton code. The overhead created is 3 byles for every 128. or 
approximately 2%. Because of this very low coding overhead, the check bytes 
(which protect themselves from SEUs) are actually stored in the DCE general 
memory CGMEM) area made up of the Harris 6516 rcs, 
Each memory sub-block (128 bytes) is periodically decoded to check for SEUs. 
rn each cycle of the wash. one 12-bit-byte from the PROGRAM RAM. and one 128-
byte block from the RAMUNIT are washed. A complete wash of the RAMUNlT (T68 
blocks) takes approximately 19 seconds. so the time-localisation of any SEU in the 
RAMUNIT is very good. 
Severe Error Characterisation. Because of the possibility that a really severe error. 
with a great many SEUs per block. could be misinterpreted by the software EDAC 
scheme as a less severe error. a further check is implemented, whereby blocks of 
memory which are no! in active use for message storage are filled with a known 
bit-pattern. As weH as checking the EDAC code. the wash routine also checks the 
blocks to make sure the bit-pattern corresponds to the known fixed pattern. If it does 
nol, a 'Severe Error' message is generated. detailing the bits which have changed. 
Although the vas! majority of errors picked up by the software EDAC scheme 
are single-bit errors. occasionally an 'extended' error is reported - i.e. more than one 
bit has been upset within a particular block. If an 'extended' error occurs within one 
of the un-used blocks, the resulting severe-error message can be used to extract 
further information. Throughout the monitoring period to the end of 1989, only three 
'extended' errors occurred, Of these. only one could be analysed via the 'severe' 
error log, and this showed that a single bit, in each of two adjacent bytes, had been 
affected. 
A hard failure was detected in one of RAMUNIT's 2K-by-8-bil HM6116 memory 
devices as the monitoring software was being developed (prior to July 1988) and 
therefore, this device is not monitored. Thus, of the 96K bytes of memory available 
in the RAMUNIT, only 94K bytes are being monitored at this time. The complete 
DCE SEU monitroing system has been active since July 1988. 
-
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IN-ORBIT MONITORING RESULTS 
Single-Event Upset Rates 
aBC : ~he observations of SEUs in the OBC NMOS DRAM memory are summarised 
in the foHowing tables :-
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bit) 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bitJ 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Table 4 Ca) 
UoSAT-2 OBC MEMORY 
Mo,/ek MKB4Il6]-<l3 16K-by-l-bit NMOS DRAM 
12 
196.608 bits 
196,608 bits 
474 days 
491 
5.269 )( Icro SEU/bit/day 
8.632 " 10-2 SEU/device/day 
Table 4 Cb} 
UoSAT-2 OBC MEMORY 
Texa, TMS4416-15NLI-20L 16K-by-4-bil NMOS DRAM 
6 (3 of each) 
393,216 bits 
393.216 bits 
474 days 
3937 
2.112 " lcr5 SEU/bit/day 
1.384 SEU/device/day 
Thus, the Texas TMS4416 devices are found to be 4.008 limes more sensitive 
(per biD, and 16.031 times mare sensitive (per device) than the Mostek MKB41l6 
devices, It would therefore appear that the per-bit error-rate in these devices scales 
exactly with the device size Le, 4 : 1. The error-rale for the aBC memory as a 
whole is 9.342 SEUs per day. 
DSR : Monitoring SEUs in the DSR started on 21st July 1988. DSR Bank 'A' was 
downloaded Virtually every week after this, and TO dumps were received prior to 
the end of December 1989, To make sure that Bank 'A' and Bank 'B' were not 
drastically different in their SEU characteristics, Bank 'B' was loaded with the fixed 
byte pattern (a CeD image) on 14th August 1988 and was surveyed for SEUs in 
September, October. November and February (1989). 
The over-an error-rate for the DSR Bank 'A' memory is 0,340 SEUs per day. 
whilst the error-rate for DSR Bank 'B' memory is 0.516 SEUs per day, Thus, it would 
appear that Bank 'B' is approximately 50% more susceptible to SEUs. The cause of 
this is not yet known. However, it does not seem to be related to the differing 
numbers of '1' and '0' bits in each bank, as an analysis of the SEU bit-transitions 
indicates that the probability of bit-upset is the same for a '1' as it is for a '0', 
The observations of SEUs in the DSR CMOS SRAM memory are summarised :.n 
the following tables :-
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bit) 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Tolal Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bit) 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Table 5 Ca) 
UoSAT·2 DSR MEMORY 
Toshiba TC55i6AP-22K-by-8-bit CMOS SRAM 
48 (Bank A) 
786.432 bits 
780.186 bits (averaged over TO surveys) 
514 days 
175 
4.364 x icrT SEU/bif/day 
7.093 x lcr3 SEU/device/day 
Table 5 (b) 
UoSAT·2 DSR MEMORY 
Toshiba TC55i6AP-22K-by-8-bit CMOS SRAM 
48 (Bank B) 
786,432 bits 
TlI,328 bits (averaged over 4 surveys; 
184 days 
95 
6.694 x lcrT SEU/bit/day 
1.076 x 1cr2 SEU/device/day 
Apart from bursts of activity which occurred on week-ending: 10/08/88 ClO 
events), 04/10/89 (ll events) and 25/10/89 (15 events). the 70 surveys of DSR Bank 
'A'. show a fairly consistent error-rate. for the entire bank. of 2.3 SEUs per week. 
The DSR SEU logs include an error pattern output. showing which bit or bits in 
a byte were upset by a given SEU. One of the important results of the DSR (and 
DCE) monitoring is that no multiple-bi! errors in a single byte have been observed. 
DCE : There are two main memory systems being monitored in the DeE: 12K 
C12-biO bytes of 'PROGRAM' CMOS SRAM. with hardware EDAC protection. and 94K 
(8-biD bytes of 'RAMUNIT' CMOS SRAM, with software EDAC protection. As part of 
the software EDAC protection of the RAMUNlT. 2304-by-8-bit check-bytes are stored 
in the 'GMEM' CMOS SRAM. giving some monitoring capability in this RAM .. 
-
-
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Table 6 
UoSAT -2 DeE 'PROGRAM RAM' MEMORY 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Tolal Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bitJ 
SEU Rale (per hybrid) 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Harris 6564 Hybrid CMOS SRAM 
06 x HM6504 4K-by-J-bil in each hybrid; 
3 Hybrids 
1 96,6Q8 bits 06K-by-12-bit-bytes} 
147,456 bits 02K-by-J2-bit bytes} 
B23 days (approximately) 
54 
4.450 >< la-I SEU/bit/day 
2.1B7 '" J0-2 SEU/device/day (HM6564j 
1.B23 '" 10-3 SEU/device/day (HM6504) 
(36 of 48 HM6504s are monitored) 
Table T (a) 
UoSAT-2 DeE 'RAMUNIT' MEMORY 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bitJ 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Hitachi HM6264LP-I2 BK-by-B-bit CMOS SRAM 
B (4 in Bank 0 and 4 in Bank J) 
524,288 bits 
524.288 bits 
549 days 
159 
5.524 '" la-I SEU/bit/day 
3.620 )( 10-2 SEU/device/day 
Table T (b) 
UoSAT -2 DeE 'RAMUNIT' MEMORY 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Total Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bitJ 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Hitachi HM6116-3/L-3 2K-by-8-bit CMOS SRAM 
16 (B in Bank 2 and 8 in Bank 3) 
262,144 bits 
245,760 bits 
549 days 
93 
6.893 )( la-T SEU/bit/day 
J.J29 )( ja-2 SEU/device/day 
Although Ihese error-rales are comparable to those for the other CMOS 
memories on the spacecraft. il is interesting to nole that the less dense 6116 devices 
appear 10 have a slightly higher error-rate Cper biD than Ihe more dense 6264 
devices. 
The DCE general memory CGMEM) RAM consists of seven Harris MI6516-9 
2K-by-8-bil CMOS SRAMS. These have no EDAC protection, and therefore cannol be 
monitored for SEU activity directly. However, check-byles generated from blocks of 
RAMUNIT memory are stored in the GMEM RAM as part of Ihe software EDAC 
system for the DeE RAMUNIT. Each 128- byte block in the RAMUNIT, has associated 
with ii, three check bytes in the GMEM RAM. These byles are 'self- protecting' and 
so if a block has an error, it is possible to tell if the error occurred in the dala bytes 
(stored in the RAMUNlT) or in the check bytes (slored in the GMEM RA,M). SELls in 
the check bytes oC'cured twice during 1988. giving some indiclation of :he 
underlying (albeit low) error-rale far the Harris devices. 
Device 
Number of Devices 
Tola! Memory Size 
Monitored Memory Size 
Monitoring Period 
Total Number of SEUs 
SEU Rate (per bit) 
SEU Rate (per device) 
Table 8 
UoSAT-2 DeE 'GMEM' Memory 
Harris MI6516-2/-9 2K-by-8-bif CMOS 5RAM 
T 12 ' MI6516-2. 5 ' MI6516-9s) 
114.688 bits (jJ2K-by-8-bit bytes) 
18.432 bits (768 blocks" 3 bytes; 
549 days 
2 
'-976 )i 10-7 SEU/bit/day 
3.238 " 10-3 SEUldevicelday 
This is consistent with the other CMOS memories on the spacecraft. 
All Systems: In summary. the error rates for the different memory devices Within 
UoSAT ~2 can be quantified as follows .~ 
Table 9 
COMPARISON OF DEVICES 
Device Chip Number of SEUs SEU Rate (Jo-T SEUlbitlday_ 
~ ~ Meas. ~ Mill ~ ~ Min. 
Harris MI6516 eK x 8) 2 6 1 1.9T6 5.929 0.9& 
Harris H6564' (4K x j) 54 68 44 4.450 5.603 3626 
Toshiba TC5516AP (2J{ x 8) 270 299 245 4.9T3 5.S0T 4.512 
Hitachi HM6264LP (SK x 8) 159 182 140 5.524 6.323 4.864 
Hitachi HM6116/L (2J{ x 8) 93 III T9 6.893 8.22T 5.856 
Mostek MKB4116] (J6K x j) 491 530 457 52.68T 56.8T2 49.038 
Texas TMS4416 (J6K x 4) 393T 2l!.230 
Harris constructed hybrid equivalent to !6 HM6504 4K x ! bit devices. 
Max. and Min. are the 5% Poisson Limits. 
The striking characteristic of this table is the similarity between the SEU rates 
for various CMOS stalic memories. The CMOS SRAMs range in size from 4 kilobits 
Cin the HM6564 hybrids) to 64 kilobits (in the HM6264 RAMs), yet these devices 
exhibit virtually the same error rate (per bit. per day) within the defined certainty 
limits. This rate is of the order of 5 x 1O~1 SEU/bit/day. 11 is also interesting to note 
that the 6116-type RAMs, not the more dense 6264~type, exhibit the highest SEU rate 
for the SRAMs. 
The DRAMs in the 1802 OBC have SEU rates from one to two orders of 
magnitude higher than for the SRAMs. !n the dynamic RAMs, it is clearly the more 
dense devices C4416-type) which exhibit higher SEU rates. DRAMs seem to be 
undesirable for SEU~sensitive applications. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~ 
-
-
--
-
-
-
SEll Analysis by Orbital Position 
Both the aBC and the DeE systems log the time at which SEUs occur. 
according to the spacecraft's internal clocks. Because of the finite nature of the wash 
period for each of these systems. the logged time represents the end of a time 
'window'. within which the SEU must have occured. For example, the wash period 
for the aBC is 8.25 minutes, so it is just possible that the time that a SEU is detected 
is 8.25 minutes later than when it actually occured. The equivalent 'window' for the 
DCE PROGRAM RAM is approximately 5.25 minutes, with only 19 seconds for the 
DeE RAMUNIT. 
3515 Single Event Umiats 
Fig. 2 UoSAT-2 aBC Memory SEU Activity Plotted Against Orbital Position 
Once the spacecraft time has been corrected to GMT. it is possible, using a 
computer model of the orbit., to locate the position of the SEUs with respect to the 
Earth. These positions can then be plotted on a map. with a worst-case precision of 
./- 15 degrees of latitude (corresponding to +/- half the aBC wash window period of 
8.25 minutes). 
Fig. 2 shows all the collected aBC SEU data plotted on a Mercator's projection 
map, together with two Polar projection maps. It is clear that the majority of SEUs 
occur in concentrated region off the coast of South America - a region known as the 
South Atlantic Anomaly (SAM, where energetic protons (few hundred MeV) are 
encountered in the VoSAT-2 orbit. There is also some enhanced activity at high 
latitudes (greater than 65°), and Fig. 3 shows that this was particularly the case in 
September and Odober 1989. At these high latitudes, the opening of the Earth 5 
magnetic fletd-lines to the interplanetary medium means that the spacecraft is more 
exposed to cosmic rays. However, the most notable enhancements in these ·aurorar 
regions, are due to the major solar proton events which occured during 1989. 
The graph of raw SEU-rate shows that these solar-flare events had a substantial 
effect on the error-rate, with the graph going off the scale during the October 19th 
event. 
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Fig 3. UoSAT -2 aBC Memory SEU Activity: January - December 1989 
These patterns of behaviour are also repeated in the other memory systems. 
However, here the pattern shows up most clearly, due to the relatively high 
sensitivity of the 4416 devices in the OBC. 
By combining these data with a model of the Earth·s magnetic field and Solar 
Geophysical Data Prompt Reports. it has been possible to determine the underlying 
error-rates due to the quiet galactic cosmic ray (GCR) background. the quiet SAA 
proton population. and to solar-flare particles. In parallel with these in-orbit studies, a 
set of memory devices, identical to those flown on VoSAT -2. have been tested at the 
Harwell Variable Energy Cyclotron (VEC) facility in the UK. and the Paul Scherrer 
Institute (PSD. in Switzerland [l8J. 
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The results of these tests are currently being fed into computer mcde\s of 
radiation-effects, and the space radiation environment. in order to assess the 
correlation between the predictions of these models and the actual in-orbit 
performance of the devices. 
The Cosmic Particle Experiment / Total Dose Experiment (CPE / TDE) 
The University of Surrey's latest ·Iightsal". UoSAT-3, which was launched into an 
800 km near-polar Sun-synchronous orbit in January 1990, carries with it a 
space-radiation monitoring experiment (CPE / TDE) built by A.E.A. Technology. 
Harwell. on behalf of the Royal Aerospace Establishment (Space DepartmentJ. 
Farnborough. UK. 
This enables the radiation environment in and around the spacecraft to be 
measured directly, allowing a quantilatve analysis of the effeels of that environment 
upon the spacecraft's systems - which includes Ihe bulk semiconduelor memory 
devices in the PACSAT Communications Experiment CPCE) transponder [19]. 
The TDE consists of seven specially manufacured p-channel MOSFETs. called 
RADFETs. which have an unusually thick gate-oxide layer (typically 0.5 micron). As 
the ionising radiation dose increases, so more positive charges become trapped in 
the gate-oxide. leading to a reduction in the threshold voltage (V r) of the device. 
By arranging a normally-biased and a normally-unbiased RADFET pair on the same 
chip, it is possible to compensate for temperature effeels, and the change in V T 
becomes proportional to the lotal dose received. For a 0.5 micron gale-oxide 
RADFET, VT falls about IV for every kilorad of dose. It is expected that the sensors 
inside UoSAT-3 (four in the CPE/TDE payload. one in the PCE payload, and one 
between the battery boxes). will acquire a kilorad of dose after approximately 3 
years in orbit. The seventh RADFET is less sensitive (0.1 micron gale-oxide), and is 
placed on the exlerior of the satellite. This should change by 1 voll for every 10 
kilorads of dose (approximately one year in orbit). 
The CPE gives a measure of the short-term radiation environment inside the 
spacecraft. integrated over a five minute period. It consisls of two detectors, each of 
which is based upon large (J cm2) area PIN diodes, which generate small amounts 
of charge as particles inlerad with Ihem {typically around 0.1 pC). The Low-Area 
Deteelor (LAD) consists of a single PIN diode, capable of measuring high-fluxes of 
low-energy particles. The High Area Deteelor (HAD) consists of ten PIN diodes. 
arranged in parallel. This is conneeled to a pulse-height analyser, which sorts out 
the particles detected into eight energy ·bins·. This is suitable for measuring the 
relatively infrequent. more-energetic particles. The experiment is primarily con'trolled 
by an 8OC31 microconlroller, which has 8K byles of data memory and 16K bytes of 
program memory. 
The CPE/TDE communicates with the peE every 5 minutes, so that the data 
from the experiment can be stored in a file. Each day, a file of radiation data is 
downloaded 10 the groundstation at Surrey. where it is analysed, before being 
passed on the RAE Farnborough, and AE.A Harwell. 
Fig 4. shows a graph of the low energy particle counl from Ihe CPE's 
large-area PIN diode array deteelor. 
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Fig 4. Solar-Flare Enhancements of the Auroral Oval Region Detected by 
the UoSAT-3 Cosmic Particle Experiment 
The regular spikes are traversals of the SAA, whereas the other. lower 
magnitude spikes. are crossings of the auroral ovals. At the left of the graph. the 
auroral levels are showing normal activity, but near midnight on 21st May 
(approximately T.450 minutes), there ,is a sudden enhancement of auroral-region 
activity due to a solar-flare event, which slowly decays over the next few hours 
(the flat Une towards the centre-right is due to the instrument being turned-off 
temporarily). However, during the evening of the 24th, another sudden enhancement 
takes place, and infact continues over the next few days, 
CONCLUSIONS 
The monitoring of in-orbit SEUs on UoSAT -2 has provided several interesting 
statistics, allowing direct comparison of slatic and dynamic RAMs ranging in 
capacity from 4 kilobits to 64 kilobits per chip, The SRAMs are significantly less 
susceptible to SEU than the DRAMS - in some cases by more than an order of 
magnitude. The static RAMs themselves do not vary conclusively as a function of 
chip capacity. and comparisons based on feature size will be necessary. 
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288K bytes of the SRAMs being monitored on UaSA T ~2 are a-bit-wide devices, 
and it was anticipated that these RAMs would experience frequent multiple bit 
upsets, with more than one upset bit in a given byte. Contrary to these expectations. 
no multiple bit errors have been observed in either of the two 96K byte banks of 
Toshiba TC5516 2K-by-8-bit devices in the DSR. Similarly, no multiple bit events 
have been observed in the 32K of Hitachi HM6116 2K-by-8-bit devices in the DeE 
RAMUNIT, although three 'extended' errors have been observed in the MK of Hitachi 
HM6264 8K-by-8-bil devices in the RAMUNIT. Of these, one 'extended' event could 
be analysed in terms of the error pattern. and was found to consist of a single bil 
error in two neighbouring byles. and so a multiple bit error in a single byte has yet 
to be observed. 
The orbital analysis of UoSAT-2 SEUs shows an overwhelming concentration of 
events in the South Atlantic Anomaly for aU device types. with a marked 
enhancement of auroral-region activity during periods of solar-flare activity. This 
was particularly the case during the major flare event of 19th October 1989. This 
result suggests that the SEU mechanism of primary concern for the UoSAT-2 orbit is 
that due to proton induced nuclear reactions within the device. 
The UoSAT-2 satellite has been operational in orbit since 1st March 1984. The 
spacecraft is in good shape and is confidently expected to operate for some years to 
come. Its predecessor. UoSAT -1. launched in October 1981. was still fully operational 
when it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere in October 1989 CUoSAT-2 is not expected 
to re-enter until some time next century). Thus. UoSAT -2 offers perhaps a unique 
opportunity to examine the long-term effects of the space radiation environment 
upon a variety of semiconductor RAMs and other microelectronic devices. 
Some aspects of the device's behaviour which would be addressed by such a 
long-term monitoring program include. examining the effect of total-dose on the SEU 
sensitivity of the devices. looking for changes in activity as the solar cycle reaches 
its peak and declines. and noting device failure mechanisms as and when they 
occur. For example. it is interesting to note that single-event latch-up has not been 
observed in any of the devices on UoSAT-2. despite their being in active use for a 
substantial part of the spacecraft·s lifetime. This result is contrary to that which might 
be expected from ground-based testing of similar devices. 
From January 1990. UoSAT-3 has joined the University of Surrey's fleet of 
technology demonstrating spacecraft. This satellite has on-board space radiation 
monitoring payloads and hosts a variety of modern microelectronic devices, 
further augmenting the space-radiation effects research being carried out at Surrey. 
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